In early 2022, protests against a sharp increase of the price for Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) started in Western Kazakhstan. These demonstrations were not as exceptional as Western media coverage suggested. For the years from 2018 to 2020, the “Central Asia Protest Tracker” counts 1,328 protest events in Kazakhstan.[1] However, due to its extent, the deployment of foreign troops, and its political consequences, the protest event of January 2022 became outstanding.
“Old Man, Go Away”: The Increase of the LPG Price was Just a Trigger
When the government’s attempt of appeasing the protesters with a price cap on LPG failed, it became apparent that the protesters pursued different objectives. Chanting “Old man, go away”, they demanded the resignation of the government. This slogan addressed the former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the éminence grise of Kazakhstan.
In response to these demands, the incumbent President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev dismissed the government and high-ranking security officers who were considered part of the Nazarbayev’s inner circle. However, Tokayev publicly claimed that the demonstrators are terrorists trained abroad. The reference to foreign influence in Kazakhstan was a pretext to call for the deployment of peace keepers of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The next day, CSTO troops including soldiers from Armenia, Belarus, Russia, and Tajikistan arrived in Kazakhstan. Since January 7th, the Kazakh security forces were allowed to use lethal force against the protesters without warning. Two days later, the minister of the interior announced the stabilisation of the situation. According to official data, by then, 164 people were dead, 2,200 injured, and 5,800 arrested.[2]
There are many theories about the identity of the demonstrators and rioters. So far it is only clear that there is no evidence supporting the terrorist thesis and that it was not a “colour revolution”. Rather, two processes took place in parallel: On the one hand, there was peaceful protest against the deteriorating socio-economic situation, on the other hand well-organised actors pursued a violent agenda.
Is Tokayev the New Strong Man in Kazakhstan?
The incumbent president, who lacks a strong power base, took the occasion to emancipate himself from his predecessor. In January, Tokayev became chairman of the National Security Council. Since November 2021, he has already been chairman of the “Nur Otan” party which renamed itself “Amanat”. The dismissal of the government was another symbol of emancipation. Apparently, this power transition happened with the support of Nazarbayev who invoked the Kazakh people to back Tokayev on January 8th.
Tokayev proceeded very cautiously with the power transition. Although some intimates of Nazarbayev were relieved from office, eleven members of the new government had already served in the previous, which had been appointed by Nazarbayev before his resignation. Tokayev did not break with the old system and signalled its beneficiaries that there is no need to worry about their privileges.
Will Tokayev be able to Build a “New Kazakhstan”?
On the occasion of the inauguration of the new Kazakh Prime Minister Alikhan Smailov, Tokayev announced political and economic reforms. In his state of the nation address, which was rescheduled from September to March 2022, Tokayev proposed ten concrete reform projects. Nine of them aim to reform Kazakhstan’s political system. However, democratization of the country remains very unlikely, as Tokayev would have to fully undermine the influence of the old elite to this end.
Instead of economic reforms, the tenth project contains economic crisis management measures. Due to its close interconnection with the Russian economy, Kazakhstan is affected by Western sanctions. Even though oil and gas prices have risen rapidly, the increase in Kazakh export revenues is neither sufficient for a considerable economic stimulus package nor fundamental socio-economic reform.
Against the backdrop of rising food prices, Tokayev prepared the population for a further decline in living standards. Public anger could rise again, if his crisis management fails. Certainly, the protesters’ aims were different from the proposed capital controls and state-led campaign in order to increase agricultural production.
Has Tokayev Handed Kazakhstan Over to Russia?
Whether the deployment of CSTO troops strengthened Russia’s influence in Kazakhstan or not, is controversially debated in the country. Most likely, CSTO troops were a signal to domestic rivals for power, especially in the security services, not to stage a coup.
To the benefit of Russia, the CSTO mission to Kazakhstan disproved earlier criticism that the CSTO is a toothless paper tiger. If CSTO member states regain trust in the organisation, Russia can use it instead of own troops to meet increasing security demands of the Central Asian countries, since the Western withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Whether Central Asian governments remain fond of Russian support for counterterrorism policy and border protection after February 24th, 2022 remains an open question. Tokayev’s foreign policy tries to balance Russian expectations for Kazakh loyalty, economic consequences of Western sanctions against Russia and the expectations of the Kazakh citizens.
Kazakhstan neither supports the Russian war of aggression, nor does it recognise the so-called People’s Republics in Eastern Ukraine. Kazakhstan delivered humanitarian aid to Ukraine in March 2022. Already in 2021, the Kazakh foreign ministry had clarified that the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is a purely economic and not a political project from its perspective. Therefore, it cannot be used for mitigating the impact of Western sanctions on Russia.
On the other side, Tokayev acknowledged the outstanding importance of an agreement on Ukraine’s neutral, non-aligned and nuclear-free status and expressed his wish for intensified economic relations with Russia during a telephone conversation with the Russian President Vladimir Putin. Balancing external relations with Russia and the West on Tokayev’s way to a “New Kazakhstan” is not less demanding than the domestic reform agenda ahead of him.
A German version of this article was published on May 31st, 2022 on the “Eastblog” by “Der Standard” [https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000135969592/auf-dem-weg-zu-einem-neuen-kasachstan]. It was written within the framework of the Jean Monnet Network “The EU and the EEU: Between Conflict and Competition, Convergence and Cooperation” (EUCON), which is financially supported by the EU as part of the “Erasmus+” program. The article reflects only the author’s view.
[1] Period January 1st, 2018 to August 31st, 2020. The “Central Asia Protest Tracker” analyses public media coverage to count protest events that take place in the physical world. The minimum number of participants is 1, and a protest event taking place in multiple locations on the same date is counted once per location. A protest event taking place on several days is counted once for each day.
[2] Faz.net: Staatsfernsehen: 164 Menschen bei Unruhen getötet.
